This paper studies the implications of exit strategies from unconventional monetary policy. Using a Markov switching DSGE model with …nancial frictions, agents in the model have rational expectations about the probability of …nancial crises, the probability of an unconventional response to crises, and the exit strategy used. Selling o¤ assets quickly produces a double-dip recession; in contrast, a slow unwind generates a smooth recovery.
Introduction
In the fall of 2008, the US economy experienced a …nancial crisis, marked by a deterioration in …nancial conditions along with a rapid slowing of real economic activity. In response, the Federal Reserve expanded its purchases of …nancial assets, injecting additional capital into the economy.
The increased demand for …nancial assets provided by the Federal Reserve helped bolster asset values and alleviate the pressure on …nancial institutions by lessening the drop in the value of assets on their respective balance sheets. The Federal Reserve accomplished this expansion in asset purchases by instituting a number of new lending facilities, such as expanding its purchases of mortgage backed securities and commercial paper. This response, deemed "unconventional monetary policy" because of the wide range of assets purchased, contrasts with "conventional monetary policy," which typically consists of purchasing short-term Treasuries to manage shortterm interest rates. In total, the value of non-Treasuries assets held by the Federal Reserve reached over $1.5 trillion. Figure 1 shows the sizeable increase in the total balance sheet, the non-Treasuries portion of the balance sheet, and a measure of interest rate spreads that jumped during the crisis, illustrating the increased level of uncertainty. Reserve's balance sheet remained at an elevated level, including approximately $1 trillion in nonTreasury assets. In other words, for years after the crisis, the Federal Reserve maintained its unconventional monetary policy due to the slow recovery that followed. Consequently, it remains to be seen how the Federal Reserve will unwind its balance sheet, and how this unwinding may a¤ect the macroeconomy.
In addition to the issue of exit strategy, given that the Federal Reserve intervened with unconventional policy, expectations about intervention policy during crises may a¤ect economic behavior during non-crisis times. If economic agents expect the central bank to intervene during crises, this expectation may distort economic outcomes prior to a crisis occurring. During the crisis, concerns about the potentially negative repercussions of precedent-setting, such as reckless risk-taking, provided arguments against using unconventional policy. Even if intervention policy bene…ts the economy during crises, if setting a precedent of intervention has negative e¤ects during non-crisis times, it may be a poor policy choice to set this precedent. On the other hand, if expectations of intervention ease fears about small probability events and allow credit to ‡ow more freely, then setting a precedent may be an entirely positive policy choice.
Consideration of the e¤ects of expectations along with the e¤ects during crises motivates an analysis of the welfare bene…ts of intervention policy. An issue similar to time inconsistency
represents an important factor in this welfare analysis: ex-ante, or before a crisis occurs, making intervention more likely could decrease welfare, but ex-post, when a crisis occurs, making intervention more likely could improve welfare. In addition, the optimal choice of an exit strategy may depend upon the timing of the decision.
This paper addresses these questions about exit strategies, e¤ects of pre-crisis expectations, and welfare costs by building a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a …nancial sector where …nancial crises occasionally occur, and conditional on a crisis occurring, the central bank may or may not intervene with unconventional policy. If the central bank does intervene, it will not do so forever, but at some point it will unwind its balance sheet, selling o¤ its accumulated assets at a speci…ed rate. Using Markov switching, the model allows agents to have rational expectations about transitions between regimes where the central bank does and does not intervene. This framework allows the study of exit strategies after intervention occurs, the e¤ects of expectations on pre-crisis economic activity, and the welfare gain or loss from di¤erent policy expectations.
A rapidly growing literature studies the implications of …nancial frictions in the macroeconomy. Many DSGE models, such as Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) , do not incorporate a …nancial sector, and therefore cannot explain movements associated with the banking system. A standard framework to incorporate a …nancial sector uses a …nancial accelerator model, as developed in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ,
and Bernanke et al. (1999) , which allows for frictions in the …nancial sector that slow the ‡ow of funds from households to …rms. Other papers that develop models of …nancial frictions include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) , Christiano et al. (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) , and Perri and Quadrini (2011) .
After the …nancial crisis, a number of papers developed models of how unconventional monetary policy a¤ects the macroeconomy. Gertler and Karadi (2010) build upon the …nancial accelerator literature by incorporating a central bank equipped with unconventional monetary policy during crises, and show that intervention can lessen the magnitude of downturns associated with …nancial crises. Other models of government intervention during …nancial crises include Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Del Negro et al. (2010) , Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a) , Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b) , Cúrdia and Woodford (2011 ), Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011 ), and Chen et al. (2012 . However, these studies of unconventional monetary policy do not explicitly consider alternative exit strategies. Models of the Federal Reserve's exit strategy often look at detailed projections of assets, but not within a DSGE framework (Carpenter et al. (2013) , Greenlaw et al. (2013) ). Angeloni et al. (2011) model exit strategies from …scal and monetary stimulus, but without considering expectations to the extent in this paper, or the welfare implications of exit strategies.
Many of the papers that consider government intervention during …nancial crises lack the expectations and transitions between the intervention and no intervention regimes studied in this paper. Absent expectations and transitions, agents view any policy changes as entirely unexpected and permanent. Therefore, without the regime switching introduced in this paper, the e¤ects of exit strategies and pre-crisis expectations have to be ignored as well. Following the rare event literature (Rietz (1988) , Barro (2006) , Barro (2009), and Gourio (2012) ), this paper allows …nancial crises to occur with a small probability, and agents form expectations over the central bank's decision to intervene conditional upon that rare event occurring. However, as in Barro et al. (2010) , the model also allows for multi-period crises -a feature that captures the recent …nancial crisis. Given the presence of expectations, intervention policy and exit strategies can in ‡uence economic behavior prior to crises occurring. Any distortion caused by expectations of crisis policy may improve or hinder economic performance, and may pave the way for macro-prudential policies (Bianchi (2011 Davig and Leeper (2007) , Farmer et al. (2009 ), Bianchi (2013 . With Markov switching, expectations over future policy rules a¤ect current dynamics of the economy. For example, in conventional monetary policy switching, expected changes in the in ‡ation target or response to in ‡ation a¤ect current in ‡ation. In this paper, the probability of changing to a regime where the central bank intervenes with unconventional policy a¤ect pre-crisis dynamics, and expectations about exit strategies a¤ect the initial e¤ectiveness of intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the model, with special emphasis on the …nancial sector. Section 3 details how the parameters of the economy change according to a
Markov Process, and details the transitions between regimes. Section 4 discusses the response of the economy to crises with and without intervention, as well as the e¤ects of di¤erent exit strategies. Section 5 analyzes the e¤ects of expectations of crisis policies on the pre-crisis economy. Section 6 discusses the welfare implications of policy announcements, and Section 7 concludes.
Model
This section describes the basic model, based on that developed in Gertler and Karadi (2010) .
The following subsections describe the households, …nancial intermediaries, government purchase of assets, intermediate goods …rms, capital producing …rms, retail …rms, government policy, and the resource constraint. Section 3 discusses the regime switching and equilibrium in detail.
Households
A continuum of households of unit measure populate the economy. These households consume, supply labor, and save by lending money to …nancial intermediaries or potentially to the government. Workers constitute a fraction (1 #) of each household, with bankers comprising a fraction #. Each worker earns wages by supplying labor to non…nancial …rms, and each banker owns a …nancial intermediary that returns its earnings to the household. Bankers become workers with probability (1 ), so a total fraction of (1 ) # transition to become workers; the same fraction transition from being workers to being bankers, with a probability independent of duration. Upon exit, bankers transfer their accumulated net worth to the household, and new bankers receive initial funds from the household. Perfect consumption insurance exists within each household.
Households choose paths of consumption C t , labor L t , and bonds B t to maximize their lifetime utility function
where E 0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t = 0, 2 (0; 1)
denotes the discount factor, h controls the degree of habit formation in consumption, { controls the disutility of labor, and ' denotes the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Households earn income from workers earning a wage W t , receive an amount t of net pro…ts from …nancial and non…nancial …rms, and pay lump sum taxes to the government T t . Bonds purchased from either …nancial intermediaries or the government pay a gross real return of R t in period t + 1. In equilibrium, both sources of bonds have no risk, so the household views them as identical with risk-free rate R t . Households thus have income R t 1 B t 1 from bonds purchased the previous period. Consequently, the household maximizes preferences (1) subject to the budget constraint:
Using a multiplier % t on (2), the household's optimal decisions imply a marginal utility of consumption
an Euler equation for bonds
and an intra-temporal labor-leisure choice condition
Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries channel funds between the households and non…nancial …rms. Financial intermediaries, indexed by j, accumulate net worth N j;t and collect deposits from households B j;t . Using these two sources of funding, they purchase claims on non-…nancial …rms S j;t at relative price Q t . The intermediaries'balance sheets require that the overall value of claims on non-…nancial …rms equals the value of the intermediaries net worth plus deposits:
In period t + 1 households'deposits made at time t pay a risk-free rate R t . The claims on non-…nancial …rms purchased at time t pay out at t + 1 a stochastic return of R k;t+1 . Financial intermediaries' net worth evolves according to the di¤erence in interest received from non…nancial …rms and interest paid out to depositors:
Hence, the intermediary's net worth grows at the risk-free rate, with any growth above that level being the excess return on assets (R k;t+1 R t ) Q t S j;t . Faster growth in net worth therefore must come from higher realized interest rate spreads R k;t+1 R t or an expansion of assets Q t S j;t .
Since the evolution in net worth depends on the interest rate spread, a banker will not fund assets if the discounted cost of borrowing exceeds the discounted expected return. Expected discounted interest rate spreads must then satisfy the banker's participation constraint
where i % t+1+i % t denotes the stochastic discount factor applied to returns in period t + 1 + i. The inequality represents a key aspect of the model with …nancial frictions: without constrained …nancial intermediaries the participation constraint exactly binds by no arbitrage, whereas in a model with …nancial frictions, …nancial intermediaries may be unable to take advantage of positive expected interest rate spreads due to borrowing or leverage constraints.
Each period bankers exit the …nancial intermediary sector and become workers with probability (1 ). This probability limits the lifespan of bankers, eliminating their ability to accumulate net worth without bound. If the participation constraint (8) holds, a banker will attempt to accumulate as much net worth as possible upon exit. Consequently, the value of being a banker V j;t equals the expected discounted terminal net worth
This expression shows that, following from the expression (7) describing growth in net worth, the value of being a …nancial intermediary increases with expected future interest rate spreads, (R k;t+1+i R t+i ), future asset levels Q t+i S j;t+i , and the risk-free return on net worth.
A banker's value depends upon their current position by
where the discounted marginal gain from expanding assets, t , follows
and the discounted marginal gain from expanding net worth, t , satis…es
In a frictionless environment, given a positive interest rate spread (R k;t+1 R t ), …nancial intermediaries want to expand their assets in…nitely by borrowing additional funds from the household. To eliminate this possibility, a friction allows, in each period, a banker to divert a fraction of its assets Q t S j;t back to the household, in which case depositors recover the remaining fraction (1 ) of assets. Consequently, the incentive constraint for the banker requires that the expected value of not diverting exceeds the value of diverting funds:
The constraint (13) binds so long as > v t , which implies that marginal increases in assets have more bene…t to the banker being diverted than as an increase in expected terminal wealth.
For the purposes of this paper, this constraint always binds, which implies assets depend on net worth by
where t = t vt denotes the leverage ratio of the …nancial intermediary. Given the price Q t and the leverage ratio t , both independent of banker-speci…c characteristics, integrating over all independent intermediaries j produces total intermediary demand:
So the total value of intermediated assets Q t S I;t equals the economy's leverage ratio t times aggregate intermediary net worth N t . This expression highlights that intermediaries'net worth in part determines the total amount of assets they supply. During …nancial crises, sharp declines in …nancial intermediary net worth limit the amount of assets the sector can provide for the economy.
Total net worth N t equals that of existing N e;t plus new bankers N n;t . Since bankers exit with probability (1 ), existing banker net worth makes up a fraction of the growth in net worth from the previous period,
In every period, a fraction (1 ) of bankers exit and become workers, transferring their accumulated net worth to the household. At the same time, an identical measure of workers become bankers, and receive an initial level of net worth from the household. Speci…cally, new bankers receive start-up funds equal to a fraction ! 1 of the assets of exiting bankers (1 ) Q t S t 1 :
Therefore, net worth evolves by
Government Assets
The previous subsection discussed the …nancial intermediary sector, and how bankers use their net worth and borrowing from households to purchase claims on non…nancial …rms. Now consider that sometimes the central bank may borrow funds from households and purchase assets. In particular, the government owns claims S g;t on non…nancial …rms at relative price Q t , for a total value of Q t S g;t . The total value of all assets in the economy equals private assets plus government assets:
The central bank purchases these assets in a manner similar to private …nancial intermediaries: by issuing debt to households B g;t at time t that pays the risk free rate R t in period t + 1.
In addition, the central bank's claims on non…nancial …rms earn the stochastic rate R k;t+1 in period t + 1. The government then will earn returns equal to (R k;t+1 R t ) B g;t .
Unlike the balance sheet constrained private …nancial intermediaries, the government does not face a moral hazard problem and consequently, the central bank faces no constraints on its balance sheet. However, for every unit of assets that the central bank owns, it pays a resource cost of . This resource cost captures any possible ine¢ ciencies from government intervention.
The government's policy rule, discussed in Section 2.7, sets a fraction t of total intermediated assets, so
As a result, total funds then depends on intermediary net worth by
where c;t =
Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods …rms operate in a competitive environment, producing using capital and labor. Firms purchase capital by issuing claims S t to …nancial intermediaries or the government, and then use the funds from issuing those claims to purchase capital for next period. After production, the …rm then pays to repair its depreciated capital and sells its entire capital on the open market. A unit of capital and claim have price Q t , so
Given a level of total factor productivity A t , capital quality t , and capital K t 1 , the …rm decides on labor demand, which pays wage W t , and a capital utilization rate U t , and produces the intermediate good Y m;t using a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share
and sells this output at price P m;t . Total factor productivity follows the process
where " a;t N (0; 1) denotes the TFP shock. Firms also face changes in capital quality t , which evolves according to the process
where " ;t N (0; 1) denotes a capital quality shock and s t indicates the regime at time t. This regime changes according to a Markov process, and a¤ects the mean of the process log m (s t ), and persistence around the mean (s t ). As in Merton (1973) , the capital quality measure t alters the e¤ective capital stock of the economy t K t 1 and thereby exogenously changes the value of capital in the economy. Section 3 contains a more detailed description of the Markov switching process for s t .
The …rm faces no adjustment costs, so period-by-period the …rm chooses its labor demand and capital utilization such that
and
The depreciation rate satis…es
where ss denotes the steady state depreciation rate, 1 = R k;ss ss + 1 ss , R k;ss and ss denote the steady states of the return on capital and capital quality, respectively, and denotes the elasticity of depreciation to capital utilization The …rm earns zero pro…ts state-by-state, so the return on capital equals
This last expression highlights how changes in the capital quality measure t produce exogenous changes in the return on capital.
Capital Producing Firms
Capital producers operate competitively, buy used capital from intermediate goods …rms, repair depreciated capital, build new capital, and sell it to the intermediate goods …rms. Gross investment I t equals the total change in capital:
Net investment I n;t equals gross investment less depreciation:
Firms face quadratic adjustment costs on construction of new capital, but not depreciated capital, given by the function f I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss = 2 I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss 1
where denotes the inverse of the elasticity of net investment to the capital price.
The capital producing …rm maximizes net present value of pro…ts
(Q t 1) I n;t f I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss (I n;t + I ss ) :
The he optimal choice of net investment yields a price of capital given by Q t = 1 + f I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss + f 0 I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss (33) E t % t+i % t f 0 I n;t+1 + I ss I n;t + I ss I n;t+1 + I ss I n;t + I ss 2 .
Retail Firms
Retail …rms, indexed by f 2 [0; 1], repackage intermediate output Y m;t into di¤erentiated products Y f;t which they sell at price P f;t . Final output equals a CES aggregate of retail …rm goods with elasticity of substitution ":
Consumers of the …nal good use cost minimization; standard optimality conditions imply that demand for good f depends on the relative price and aggregate demand:
Since retail …rms repackage intermediate output, their marginal cost equals P m;t . Firms set their price according to Calvo pricing with indexation to lagged in ‡ation: a …rm can reoptimize each period with probability (1 ), and with probability sets P f;t = t 1 P f;t 1 , where 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of price indexation. A …rm optimizing its price at time t maximizes the expected present value of pro…ts
subject to demand (35). The optimal relative priceP t = P f;t =P t therefore satis…es:
Given Calvo pricing with indexation, the optimal relative price level follows
Finally, the loss of output from price dispersion & t evolves according to
Government Policy
Government policy has three aspects: a standard monetary policy rule, an unconventional policy rule, and …scal policy. Conventional monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate r t according to a Taylor rule
where r ss denotes the steady state nominal rate, and y control responses to in ‡ation and to deviations of output from it's ‡exible-price counterpart Y t , respectively, and " r;t N (0; 1)
denotes an interest rate shock. 1 A no-arbitrage condition for households between deposits and nominal bonds requires
The government sets its unconventional asset holding t according to
where the response to the expected interest rate spread (s t ) and an autoregressive term (s t ) change according to a Markov process to be discussed in Section 3.
Finally, the government has a …xed amount of spending G equal to a fraction g of steady state output Y ss , plus it must pay a resource cost on its assets. It …nances these via lump-sum taxes T t and the return from its previously held assets. Consequently, the government's budget constraint requires
Resource Constraint
The resource constraint requires that output be used for consumption, investment plus capital adjustment costs, and government spending including the resource cost of intervention:
The economy wide evolution of capital follows K t = t K t 1 + I n;t f I n;t + I ss I n;t 1 + I ss (I n;t + I ss ) ,
re ‡ecting that capital quality shocks a¤ect the accumulation of capital.
Regime Switching and Equilibrium
This section embeds the core model into a regime switching framework. Parameters in two equations switch according to a Markov process: the exogenous process for capital quality (24) and the unconventional policy rule (42). The next two subsections discuss the switching in these equations, Section 3.3 summaries the switching, and Section 3.4 covers the calibration and solution method.
Markov Switching in the Capital Quality Process
The …rst switching equation governs the exogenous process for capital quality (24):
The functional form allows for changes in the mean of the process through the term m (s t ) ; and changes in the persistence (s t ), where s t denotes the state of the Markov Process. Allowing for changes in the mean and the persistence captures a wide variety of possible switching dynamics.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, changes in capital quality drive exogenous ‡uctuations in the value of capital, and signi…cant declines generate a …nancial crisis.
The two switching parameters m (s t ) and (s t ) each take on two values, and these values depend upon a common Markov process. Speci…cally, the values depend upon whether or not the economy experiences a …nancial crisis. In non-…nancial crisis normal times, then the process has mean n m = 1, and persistence n 2 (0; 1), where the superscript n denotes "no crisis." With probability p c , the economy experiences a …nancial crisis, and the mean of the process switches to a lower level c m < 1, where the superscript c indicates "crisis" and the persistence switches to c = 0. With probability p e , the economy exits the crisis and returns to the "no crisis" mean and persistence.
The dual changes in parameters between non-crisis and crisis have two e¤ects. First, when the economy enters a crisis, the crisis mean c m < 1 implies that average capital quality decreases. The crisis persistence c = 0 implies that capital quality jumps downward to this lower mean.
Second, when the economy leaves a crisis, the mean n m = 1 implies that average capital quality returns to its original level, but the persistence n 2 (0; 1) implies a gradual reversion to this higher mean. These two features capture the typically rapid entry into …nancial crises, with a quick transition to a low capital quality, while after the crisis ends the economy takes time to return back to its pre-crisis level.
The transition probabilities also assume an asymmetry between entering into and exiting out of …nancial crises. Independent parameters govern the probability of entering (p c ) and exiting (p e ), which incorporates a wide variety of timing assumptions. In, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2010) or , crises represent zero probability events (p c = 0) that only last one period (p e = 1). On the other hand, in , crises occur as independent events (p c = 1 p e ). Most importantly, in this paper, the probabilities allow agents to expect that crises can occur, and, if a crisis does occur, it can last several quarters.
Markov Switching in Unconventional Policy
The second switching equation governs unconventional policy (42):
where the Markov switching a¤ects the response to the expected interest rate spread (s t ) and an autoregressive term (s t ). While an independent Markov process controls the exogenous process for capital quality, the Markov process for the unconventional policy rule depends on the realization of the capital quality process. This feature captures the fact that, when a crisis occurs, the central bank may or may not intervene, but the onset of a crisis triggers the decision to intervene or not. In other words, the central bank will never begin intervention without a crisis. In addition, the central bank may continue to intervene beyond the end of the crisis.
Prior to a crisis, the central bank does not intervene, so it sets the spread response parameter to n = 0 and the persistence to n 2 [0; 1), where the superscript n denotes "no intervention."
When a crisis occurs, which happens with probability p c , the central bank intervenes with unconventional policy with probability p i , where i denotes "intervention." If it does not intervene, then the spread response and persistence remain n = 0 and n , respectively. If the central bank does intervene, it responds to the interest rate spread with magnitude i > 0 and sets the persistence parameter at i = 0. These dual switches in parameters imply that the central bank increases its intervention with the magnitude of the crisis, since the intervention increases with the expected spread. After the crises ends, which occurs with probability p e , the central bank enters a period where it doesn't adjust its degree of intervention, so it sets the response to h = 0 but h = 1, where h denotes "holding;" this form implies that t = t 1 . Finally, with probability p s the central bank stops intervening, in which case n = 0 and n 2 [0; 1), meaning that intervention eventually returns to zero.
The Markov switching speci…cation implies that when the central bank intervenes, it does so by purchasing assets depending on the expected spread: i (E t R k;t+1 R t ). When it does not intervene, it sets i = 0, and the persistence remains n 2 [0; 1). These values imply two features about the no intervention case. First, if t 1 = 0, meaning the central bank previously had no assets, then it will continue to have no assets. Second, if it does have assets, so t 1 > 0, then it may continue to hold assets, but will be decreasing its balance sheet size. Consequently, the parameter n captures the exit strategy after a crisis. If n 2 (0; 1), when the rule switches from intervention to no intervention, there will be an unwind of the accumulated assets. On the other hand, if n = 0, then when the rule switches to no intervention, then instantly t = 0, meaning the central bank exits the asset market with an immediate sell-o¤.
The policy rule (42) captures several important aspects of policy. First, the magnitude of the intervention depends upon the size of the crisis, in that larger spreads lead to a higher degree of intervention. Second, it allows the central bank to maintain its degree of intervention for an extended period after the crisis ends and spreads begin returning to their non-crisis level; since slow recoveries often follow …nancial crises (Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) ), the central bank may desire to keep intervention in place for several years after the initial shock. Third, the stopping probability p s captures some uncertainty in markets about exactly how long the central bank will maintain its intervention. Finally, the exit strategies consider two divergent cases: with slowly unwound intervention, or a fast sell-o¤ caused by a desire to get out of capital markets quickly.
Regime Switching Summary
Based on the preceding discussion of the switching in the capital quality process and the unconventional policy equation, the model has four total regimes. The …rst regime, "normal times,"
has high average capital quality and the central bank either holds no assets or unwinds its assets.
The second regime, called "crisis without intervention," has low average capital quality and the central bank holds no assets or unwinds. The third regime, "crisis with intervention," has low average capital quality and the central bank intervenes according to the expected spread. The fourth regime, "post-crisis with intervention," has high average capital quality and the central bank maintaining its intervention level. Table 1 summarizes the switching parameters across these regimes.
Given the transition probabilities between the regimes, the transition matrix has elements 
Calibration and Model Solution
Given that the recent …nancial crisis and the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy response represent unique events in history, the results in this paper rely on calibrated rather than estimated parameters. However, the results explore the implications of key parameters.
The unit of time equals a quarter. Table 2 shows the baseline calibration of parameters for preferences and production, which follow estimates in Primiceri et al. (2006) , and the calibration of the parameters governing …nancial intermediaries, which follow Gertler and Karadi (2010) . Table 3 shows the calibration of the regime switching parameters. The transition probabilities and switching parameters introduced in this paper capture various aspects of the recent …nancial crisis. First, following Barro (2006) , the probability of crises equals p c = 0:005, implying a roughly two percent chance of a crisis per year. Motivated by Figure 1 , which showed interest rate spreads spiking to above 5% for seven months, the probability of exiting a crisis equals p e = 0:5, implying an expected duration of two quarters. The probability of intervention p i and of intervention stopping p s will vary, but the baseline calibration has p s = 1=18, which, along with the expected crisis duration, implies a total duration of intervention of 20 quarters Figure 1 shows that, at the end of 2012, four years after the onset of the crisis, the Federal Reserve continued to hold non-Treasury assets. Alternatively, the central bank could have a shorter or longer expected holding duration of either 12 or 28 total quarters, To solve the described Markov switching DSGE model, this paper uses the perturbation approach of Foerster et al. (2013) . Given the switching nature of the parameters, standard perturbation techniques such as those developed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) do not apply. The iterative procedure developed by Foerster et al. (2013) …nds an approximation to the solution to the economy by guessing a set of approximations under each regime; given a guess, each regime's approximation follows from standard perturbation techniques, and the iterative algorithm stops when obtained approximations equal the guesses. This perturbation approach has two major advantages. First, the method introduces Markov switching from …rst principles, which in turn allows for a ‡exible environment that includes switching that a¤ects the steady state of the economy. Given that the switching equations involve switching means, the economy's regime-speci…c steady states will di¤er, a feature perturbation handles easily. In addition, perturbation allows for second-and higher-order approximations, which improve the ability to capture the e¤ects of expectations and for welfare calculations. For tractability, the impulse responses in Section 4 use …rst-order approximations, while the e¤ects of expectations and welfare in Sections 5 and 6 use second-order approximations.
Crisis Responses and Exit Strategies
Having discussed the basic model and the nature of regime switching, this section considers …nancial crises, the e¤ects of intervention, and exit strategies. Given the Markov switching transitions, each regime has uncertain duration; the following results describe a "typical" crisis.
In these experiments, agents know the probabilities fp c ; p e ; p i ; p s g that dictate the transitions in the economy. In a typical crisis, the realized durations equal the expected durations: the crisis lasts 1=p e periods, and unwinding of intervention begins 1=p s periods after the crisis ends.
Given the baseline parameterization of p e = 0:5 and p s = 1=18, if the typical crisis begins at t = 0, it ends in t = 2, and unwinding beings in t = 20. Across models, as Section 5 shows, the pre-crisis level of the economy changes depending upon the expectations about policy during crises. In order to focus on the e¤ects of crises and intervention, the following results therefore simply consider deviations from the pre-crisis average level of the economy produced by the typical crisis for a given model.
Intervention Versus No Intervention
First, consider the e¤ects of a crisis under a guarantee of intervention (p i = 1) versus one of no intervention (p i = 0). With guaranteed no intervention, the economy remains in the "normal times" regime for t < 0, experiences a crisis in period t = 0 when it automatically moves to the "crisis without intervention" regime, and then at t = 2 the crisis ends and the economy moves back to the "normal times" regime. With guaranteed intervention, the economy remains in the "normal times" regime for t < 0, and when a crisis occurs at t = 0 it moves automatically to the "crisis with intervention" regime. Then, at t = 2, the crisis ends and the economy moves to the "post-crisis with intervention" regime, where it stays until t = 20, at which time it switches to the "normal times" regime and the central bank unwinds its intervention. occurs, capital quality drops …ve percent for the duration of the crisis -two periods in this case -and then returns to its pre-crisis levels. When p i = 0, the level of intervention remains at zero. The shock to capital quality reduces banker net worth, driving the leverage ratio up, and causing a drop in the price of capital, which creates a …nancial accelerator e¤ect of further diminishing banker net worth. Since the …nancial intermediaries have less net worth, they borrow less due to their leverage constraint, which drives interest rates down and spreads up, and capital declines with less investment. The increase in spreads lasts two quarters before declining, roughly corresponding to the recent crisis in the US, and in contrast to the one-period spike in spreads generated by a one-period shock. In total, the drop in output from its pre-crisis level nears 6.5%.
When p i = 1, the central bank intervenes on impact of the crisis, purchasing nearly six percent of assets and holding them for 20 quarters. The additional demand for capital provided by the central bank in this circumstance works against the …nancial accelerator e¤ect: the price of capital drops slightly less, leading banker net worth to drop slightly less, and the leverage ratio and interest rate spreads to increase less than without intervention. The increased ability of the private sector to provide capital, as well as that provided by the central bank, yields a trough in output around 5.5% of below its pre-crisis level -intervention lessens the recession by about 1 percentage point. At t = 20, the central bank begins to unwind, and does so very gradually, since n = 0:99 in this case, leading to a smooth, albeit slow, transition of the economy back to its pre-crisis levels. 
Exit Strategies
Now suppose the central bank guarantees intervention (p i = 1), but that the unwind rate after intervention ends di¤ers. With a slow unwind n = 0:99 , the results comparing intervention versus no intervention showed that the economy transitions slowly but smoothly back to its pre-crisis level. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of this slow unwind contrasted with the case of a sell-o¤ n = 0 . With both the slow unwind and sell-o¤, the intervention rule remains the same, but at t = 20, when the economy switches back to the "normal times" regime, the central bank immediately unloads its asset holdings rather then unwinding them over an extended period.
This sell-o¤ has two main implications: contemporaneous to the sell-o¤ and beforehand through expectations.
When the sell-o¤ occurs at t = 20, the central bank unloading its assets immediately serves as a …re sale of assets, which depresses the price of capital. The decline in the price of capital diminishes the net worth of bankers, leading to a decline in interest rates, and a jump in the private leverage ratio and the interest rate spread. Since the central bank no longer provides capital and the loss in net worth decreases the private sector's ability to do so, the rebound in capital slows from a loss in investment, and output drops again, by approximately one percentage point. Importantly, all of these responses mimic what occurred during the initial crisis, except that at t = 20 capital quality has fully recovered. In other words, the sell-o¤ creates a second …nancial crisis, generating a double-dip recession due exclusively to policy.
The expectations of a sell-o¤ also create di¤erences in policy e¤ectiveness even before the sell-o¤ occurs. The slow unwind and sell-o¤ have identical policy rules in that they respond equally to changes in the interest rate spread ( i = 3), they only di¤er in how quickly unwind occurs. When agents in the economy expect a sell-o¤ to occur at some future date, they must worry about the crisis but also the double-dip recession. In fact, given household consumption smoothing through habits, they have a strong incentive to provide more labor and save to smooth consumption through the ensuing double dip. As a consequence, a policy of a sell-o¤ leads to a smaller initial recession, a lower spread, and hence less intervention than the case with a slow unwind. The sell-o¤ policy produces an initial drop in output about half a percentage point less than with an unwind.
Consequently, the sell-o¤ exit strategy represents an interesting trade-o¤. It creates a double-dip recession when exit occurs, but because agents in the economy expect this sell-o¤, they take actions to smooth consumption. These expectations make policy actually more 
Holding Duration
The previous results discussed the fact that an exit strategy of an immediate sell-o¤ produces a slightly better outcome through the expectations channel but creates a double-dip recession when the sell-o¤ occurs. Now consider di¤erent holding durations as well as the possibility for a moderate unwind strategy. Figure 4 shows the responses of output to the baseline stopping probability p s = 1=18 versus the alternatives of a shorter or longer holding time, at p s = 1=10 or p s = 1=26 quarters, respectively. For each duration, the …gure shows the responses to both the slow unwind n = 0:99 and the sell-o¤ n = 0 previously considered, but also a moderate unwind n = 0:50 .
Changing the expected holding duration produces similar responses to the baseline duration.
The slow unwind produces a gradual recovery in output to its pre-crisis level, with similar responses for all durations. Similarly, for all durations the sell-o¤ policy produces a smaller initial drop but generates a double-dip recession when the central bank exits from its asset position. The size of the double-dip recession decreases with duration: selling-o¤ assets soon after the crisis with a still-weak economy leads to larger negative e¤ects. The sell-o¤ after the longer holding duration still produces the double-dip recession, however.
In addition to the change in duration, the moderate unwind case represents a mixture between the slow unwind and the sell-o¤ cases. With the moderate unwind, the central bank exits quickly, leading to a less-immediate but similarly sized double-dip as that experienced with a sell-o¤.
Consequently, a moderate unwind still produces a double-dip recession, but a more gradual one that simply delays the recovery.
Pre-Crisis: E¤ects of Expectations
The previous section focused on the e¤ects of intervention and exit strategies during crises, this section examines how expectations of intervention and exit strategies a¤ect non-crisis times.
The Markov switching framework established in Section 3 gives agents expectations that crises can occur, as well as expectations about the probability of intervention by the central bank, and the duration of intervention and exit strategy if intervention does occur. These expectations a¤ect prices and quantities before crises occur. Consequently, this section examines how the stochastic steady state of the economy associated with the "normal times" regime changes as the probability of intervention conditional on a crisis increases from p i = 0 to p i = 1, and the implications of the expected exit strategy.
To characterize the e¤ects of expectations, these results use a second-order approximation, which Foerster et al. (2013) show improves accuracy and captures lack of certainty equivalence.
In other words, expectations about future regimes will a¤ect the means and standard deviations in the normal times regime. The ergodic distribution in the normal regime results from a long simulation in which agents in the economy expect regime switches, but ex-post along the simulated path, no switches occur.
Pre-Crisis Stochastic Steady State Mean
In the baseline parameterization, agents perceive crises occur with probability p c = 0:005, crises end with probability p e = 0:5, and any intervention stops with probability p s = 1=18. Figure   5 shows the percent change in the mean of the "normal times" stochastic steady state relative to a benchmark economy where p c = 0, which implies agents do not expect crises, and hence do not expect intervention.
Consider the baseline parameterization with p c = 0:005 but p i = 0, which makes the exit strategy irrelevant. Moving from an economy where agents do not expect crises (p c = 0), to one where they expect crises without intervention has two main implications. Households, on the one hand, have an incentive to precautionary save in order to smooth consumption during times of crises. In the stochastic steady state, this incentive increases household savings, boosting up capital accumulation and raising output and consumption. On the other hand, crises bring poor interest rate realizations for bankers, who will supply more net worth, have lower leverage, and consequently create a lower amount of capital for the economy, leading to lower output and consumption. Figure 5 shows that in aggregate, the latter of these e¤ects dominates: the economy with crises and p i = 0 has lower capital, leverage, and capital prices, along with higher banker net worth. Households end up supplying more labor to compensate for the lower capital stock, which increases aggregate output, but with a lower consumption level.
As p i increases from 0 to 1, agents expect intervention with a higher probability, and so the exit strategy matters. Since intervention dampens the e¤ects of crises, increasing the probability Risk Free Rate of intervention tends to erode households'precautionary incentive, lowering the capital stock.
However, intervention provides more favorable interest rate conditions for bankers, which will tend to increase their leverage ratio, and increase the capital stock. On net, the latter e¤ect dominates, and the capital stock and leverage ratio increase with the intervention probability.
Banker net worth declines, since they have the ability to supply capital through higher leverage.
Households supply more labor and consume more. The exit strategy matters for the magnitudes of these e¤ects, and with the sell-o¤ strategy, capital, labor, and consumption increases with the intervention probability, and output slightly declines rather than increases.
Pre-Crisis Stochastic Steady State Standard Deviations
Expectations a¤ect not only the means of economic variables in the "normal times" regime, but their standard deviations as well. Figure 6 shows the percentage change in the "normal times" stochastic steady state's standard deviations relative to the no crises benchmark economy
When agents expect crises but not intervention, households have a precautionary motive and bankers have higher net worth and lower leverage. These e¤ects lead to lower volatility of the economy in the normal times regime, as all variables have lower standard deviations when agents expect crises but expect no intervention. As the intervention probability increases, the leverage ratio increases, as does the capital stock, as the intervention erodes precautionary behavior and allows bankers to have more leverage. These factors increase the volatility of leverage, banker net worth, and the interest rate spread, but lower the volatility of output, consumption, and capital. A sell-o¤ exit strategy increased the average level of output, consumption, and capital by a lower amount relative to a slow unwind strategy, and this fact translates to larger volatility increases in banker net worth and private leverage, along with lower volatility increases in output, consumption, and capital.
Welfare Calculations
Having considered the e¤ects of policy announcements and expectations during and before crises, this section turns to evaluating the overall welfare gains or losses from di¤erent policy announcements. In particular, Section 4 discussed the fact that guaranteed intervention had bene…ts relative to no intervention during crises, since intervention helps bolster the economy and alleviate the crisis. However, a slight trade-o¤ depended upon the exit strategy: the immediate sell-o¤ case produced a slightly lower drop in output and consumption, but upon exit, the economy experienced a double-dip recession. In addition, in Section 5, the e¤ects of increasing the probability of intervention created pre-crisis distortions that increased consumption, but also labor.
Importantly, in addition to the probability of intervention and the exit strategy considered, two factors a¤ect the welfare costs. First, the resource cost of central bank intermediation matters for welfare, since a high cost implies a larger loss of output from intervention, which may lower welfare. Second, the timing of the calculation matters for welfare costs. Speci…cally, the household's gain or loss in welfare from di¤erent policies depends upon whether they experience a crisis or not. The ex-ante welfare costs measure the willingness to pay for intervention before a crisis, while the ex-post welfare costs measure willingness to pay when a crisis occurs, but before realization of the intervention outcome.
To calculate welfare, consider the value function formulation of household preferences (1):
Adding this equation to the equilibrium conditions, along with a second-order approximation,
gives an accurate measure of the value function given the state, regime, intervention probability p i , stopping probability p s , exit strategy n , and resource cost .
The welfare measure equals the percentage increase in expected lifetime consumption under guaranteed no intervention that would make households indi¤erent between the increase in consumption and a policy of a given probability of intervention and exit strategy. Positive welfare measures indicate that intervention increases welfare, since households need additional consumption under the given speci…cation to mimic positive intervention probabilities. Negative welfare measures then imply intervention decreases welfare, with households willing to give up consumption rather than have positive intervention probabilities. The top two plots show that, even when = 0, increases in intervention probability have di¤erent implications ex-ante versus ex-post. Before crises, increasing the probability of intervention increases consumption but also increases labor, leading to lower welfare. A sell-o¤ exit strategy increases consumption and labor by less than the slow unwind strategy, leading to lower welfare. When a crisis hits, agents prefer intervention with a slow unwind, since this strategy limits the magnitude of the drop from the crisis and avoids a double-dip recession. The welfare implications of the sell-o¤ imply agents remain roughly indi¤erent between no intervention and intervention with a sell-o¤, since intervening eases the initial crisis, but creates a double-dip recession.
Welfare and the Resource Cost
The middle two panels change some of the implications of intervention. When = 0:001, increasing the probability of intervention decreases ex-ante welfare, but as opposed to the case with = 0, the slow unwind produces the greater decline in welfare. Considering welfare expost, increasing the probability of intervention only increases welfare with a slow unwind exit strategy; a sell-o¤ strategy leads to lower welfare from higher intervention probabilities, which re ‡ects the negative impact of the double-dip recession.
Finally, when = 0:002, shown in the bottom two plots, intervention decreases welfare in all cases. In the ex-post case, the sell-o¤ exit strategy dominates the slow unwind strategy; the high resource cost makes agents in the economy prefer to experience the quick exit and double-dip recession rather than have the central bank slowly unwind its assets.
The di¤erent levels of the resource cost dictate the preferred policy environment from a welfare perspective. Even with no resource cost, increasing the probability of intervention creates distortions that lower ex-ante welfare. Under the = 0:001 parameterization, the preferred intervention probability changes ex-ante versus ex-post. Prior to a crisis occurring, positive intervention probabilities decrease welfare, and the sell-o¤ produces higher welfare.
When a crisis occurs, positive probabilities and a slow unwind strategy increase welfare, and the slow unwind produces higher welfare. These changes between the ex-ante versus ex-post welfare implications suggest that the central bank may face a time-inconsistency problem in designing optimal policy, and hence may …nd commitment di¢ cult. Figure 8 shows that the di¤erences between the ex-ante and ex-post welfare measures when = 0 for di¤erent intervention stopping probabilities. The probability of stopping varies from p s = 1=18 to the shorter holding duration p s = 1=10 and the longer duration p s = 1=26 considered in the crises responses of Figure 4 .
Welfare and Holding Duration
When the expected total holding duration changes from 20 to either 12 or 28 quarters, the ex-ante welfare implications do not change. With the shorter expected holding duration, the sell-o¤ exit strategy lowers welfare ex-post, while the slow unwind strategy remains positive. In this case, the central bank intervenes for a short period and creates a double-dip recession with a fast sell-o¤, leading to negative welfare implications. The ex-post sell-o¤ strategy increases welfare in the longer expected holding duration, as the sell-o¤ occurs far enough in the future to diminish its negative implications. All of these cases highlight the fact that raising the intervention probability lowers ex-ante welfare, but can increase it ex-post.
Conclusion
This paper used a model of unconventional monetary policy along with regime switching to study the e¤ects of exit strategies and expectations. After intervention, if the central bank exits its unconventional policy with a sell-o¤, the economy experiences a double-dip recession, whereas a slow unwind produces a gradual recovery. Expectations about exit strategies matter for the initial e¤ectiveness of the intervention, and the sell-o¤ exit strategy produces more e¤ective intervention and a smaller output drop than a slow unwind. In addition, increasing the probability of intervention during crises causes distortions in pre-crisis activity by altering agents'expectations, the magnitude of this distortion depends upon the exit strategy. Finally, the welfare bene…ts of increasing the probability of intervention can raise or lower welfare, and that the timing of the welfare calculation matters as well as the type of exit strategy used.
These di¤erences imply that the central bank may face a time-inconsistency issue in trying to design optimal policy. 
